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“The money market is always, as it were, the headquarters of the capital-
ist system, from which orders go out to its individual divisions , and that 
which is debated and decided there is always in essence the settlements 
of plans for future development. All kinds of credit requirements come to 
this market; all kinds of economic projects are first brought into relation 
with one another, contend for their realization in it; all kinds of purchasing
power, balances of every sort, flow to it to be sold.” (Schumpeter, 1934)
“We leave saving to the private investor, and we encourage him to place 
his savings mainly in titles to money. We leave the responsibility for set
ting production in motion to the business man, who is mainly influenced 
by the profits he expected to accrue to himself in terms of money. Those
who are not in favour of drastic changes in the existing organization of 
society believe that these arrangements, being in accord with human 
nature, have great advantages. But they cannot work properly if the 
money, which they assume as a stable measuring-rod, is undependable. 
Unemployment, the precarious life of the worker, the disappointment of 
expectation, the sudden loss of savings, the excessive windfalls to indi-
viduals, the speculator, the profiteer—all proceed, in large measure, from 
the instability of the standard of value” (Keynes, 1936)    
“The task confronting economics today may be characterized as a need to
integrate Schumpeter’s vision of a resilient intertemporal capitalist process
with Keynes’ hard insights into the fragility introduced into the capitalist 
accumulation process by some inescapable properties of capitalist financial
structures “ (Minsky, 1986)
The financial sector has been viewed traditionally as either providing the
“oil” for the “wheels of commerce” or as a parasite on the real sector of
the economy where real productivity gains provide for increasing real wages
and per capita incomes. However, the work of a series of writers in the tra-
dition of the “knowledge and innovation” approach to the theory of the firm
allows the analysis of financial institutions on a par with the production sec-
tor of the economy. The present paper will thus attempt to utilise “the
knowledge-based” nature of firms’ operations as set out in the diverse the-
oretical frameworks of Schumpeter, Coase, Richardson, Penrose, Chandler
and others to stress the importance of organisational and managerial tech-
niques in the creation of market dominance by particular financial firms in
the same way that these theories have analysed industrial firms
1. 
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1 The increased interest in that “knowledge perspective” is explicit, for instance, in  the two volume
collection of essays in honour of Brian Loasby , where in some of the papers its “Smithian” origins
is underlined and traced to the present through the works of John Rae, Marshall, Schumpeter and
Young. (Cf. Dow and Earl, ed.: 1999). This same sort of concern is also being worked by Lündvall
and his collaborators ( Cf. Foray and Lündvall: 1996). None of them, however, addresses financial
firms or financial activities. The paper will also analyze the process of competition between different
firms and between different financial structures in terms of the impact of
different organisational regimes on profitability, efficiency, and instability of
the economic system. This view of the operation of manufacturing and
financial firms will then be linked with its mesodynamic counterpart first
outlined  in the work of Schumpeter, Minsky, and Vickers (cf. Schumpeter,
1934, 1939,1942, Minsky, 1982,1986,Vickers, 1968, 1987, Kregel,
1989-90) on the relationships between industrial competition, financial
dynamics and competition in the financial sphere. Tracing the market
dynamic of competition and market dominance based on the capture of
knowledge-based advantages to its mesodynamic outcome produces a
coherent  explanation of systemic instability which amalgamates Knight-
Keynes uncertainty, Schumpeterian financial leverage to exploit productivi-
ty enhancing innovations, and Minsky’s tendency towards financial fragili-
ty and debt deflations. This analysis also leads to diverse policy recom-
mendations concerning financial regulation, institution building, and micro-
financial structure that are consistent with the other contributions to the
“other Canon”. 
This “other Canon” has always stressed the importance of technological
innovations based on the accretion of knowledge as the motor force driv-
ing economic development. Its “classical” roots have been recently resur-
rected in the work of Luigi Pasinetti. However, his work does not give the
same importance to institutions and market forms as some other work in
the field which suggest that certain economic activities and particular indus-
tries in particular historical periods lend themselves more readily to the
absorption of knowledge-specific activities. Thus, in the tradition of Joseph
Schumpeter and Alfred Eichner (Cf. Schumpeter, 1942 [1992]: chapters 7-
8, Eichner, 1976: Introduction) “imperfect competition”, viewed in the as
the natural result of the competitive process, is a requirement for the gen-
eration of  the technologically innovative activities required for growth and
accumulation based on exploitation of this advantage through international
exchange. Just as a single domestic producer seeks to exploit the advan-
tages of technological dominance through market dominance, countries will
seek to exploit their technological advantages through trade with other
countries that is mutually advantageous, but seeks greater benefits by pro-
tecting their technological advantages (Cf. List, 1841 [1983] book II ,
Kaldor, 1967, Wade, 1990) . 
42. Competition and the Dynamics of Manufacturing and Banking Firms 
“…The entrepreneur is the typical debtor in capitalist society” 
(Schumpeter, 1934)
“If innovations are possible, any long-term commitment to specific production
techniques is uncertain” ( Shackle, 1970)
“Business has become terribly complex (and) survival is very uncertain in an 
environment filled with risk, the unexpected, and competition” 
(Matsushita Konusuke, 1988)
“Both the evolutionary approach and the competence perspective are founded
on a (Penrosian) notion of the firm as a knowledge-creating entity” 
(N. Foss, 1996)
The equivalence in the way manufacturing industry and financial services
contribute to the creation of wealth in the economy is based on the
assumption that financial services institutions operate in exactly the same
way as industrial firms. Although there is a long tradition that views com-
mercial banks as peculiar because they possess a special informational
advantage relative to other types of financial institution or manufacturing
firms, from the point of view of Chandler’s analysis there seems to be no
organisational advantage relating to the use of information that is peculiar
to commercial banks compared to other financial institutions. The factor of
knowledge absorption seems to be a general characteristic of successful
business operation.  
The traditional canon provides little help in the integration of financial insti-
tutions into the analysis of the activities of firms since, according to the
work of Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase, it does not provide an explanation
of the existence of firms. Coase’s attempt to provide such an explanation
thus serves as a useful starting point.
2.1. The Knowledge-Based Theory of Firm Organization: Capabilities,
Strategic Management and Uncertainty
In his now famous 1937 article Ronald Coase jolted the traditional canon
by pointing out that in a “large sphere in our economic system” the alloca-
tion of resources by relative prices determined in competitive markets
which is the basis of the canon of traditional economic theory is supersed-
ed by the directed organisation of production within the firm. Thus the tra-
ditional canon had no application in this “large sphere” and had nothing to
say about it operation. 
In a retrospective consideration of his views (Cf . Williamson and Winter ed.
1991) Coase notes that little attention has been paid to this challenge to
traditional theory and that economists seem to have lost sight of his “key
idea: ... the comparison of the costs of coordinating the activities of factors
5of production within the firm with the costs of bringing about the same
result by market transactions” (Ibid., p. 65). He reiterates that the “basic
reason” for the existence of firms is “the avoidance of the costs of con-
tracting between factors of production” (Ibid., p.67, emphasis added), not
the reduction of the costs of transactions “between the organisers of the
firm and the factors of production it uses” (Ibid., p. 68) which might derive
from long-term contracts which do not specify the particulars of the
employee-employer relationship. 
On this view, Coase appears to come close to the position of Chandler
when he credits the success of business firms with more efficient organi-
sation and management in bringing about the coordination of factors in
complex processes of production. In Chandler’s view managerial organisa-
tion itself is a technique of production that gives firms “first mover” advan-
tages that allow them to introduce new production technologies and com-
petitive domination in the markets for their products. To the extent that the
disadvantages of arranging market contracts between factors arises from
relative price instability that creates uncertainty, this view is also close to
that which considers the firm a “pool of stability” that allows the long range
planning, research and coordination necessary to launch new innovations
(Cf. Coase, 1937 [1991],Chandler, 1990).
Chandler’s work provides a chronicle of the ongoing struggle to be the first
to achieve market advantage faced by firms operating in competitive mar-
kets. The history of this ongoing struggle depicts an operating environment
in which continuous change and unforeseen circumstance is the most
important feature threatening the survival of the firm. Chandler’s archival
work thus confirms Schumpeter’s approach to capitalism as an historical
process in which change, rather than equilibrium, is the most relevant fea-
ture. In contrast to the traditional canon, one of the factors that leads to
the success of firms over other alternative organisations of production is the
organisational efficiency exhibited by firms in dealing with the “change” and
instability inherent in the economic system. Response to change may take
place through the adaptation of the existing management and organisation
of production or by change in the organisation itself (Cf. Best, 1990,
Lazonick, 1991, and Chandler et alii, 1997). 
The efficient organisational reaction to an uncertain environment is compe-
tition among firms who use creative innovations applying new ideas, meth-
ods, or resource combinations to survive by  exploiting the opportunities of
change.
2 But the very success of this competitive reaction acts to reinforce
6
2 Although, as Nelson and Winter, Paul David, , and Brian Arthur, among other have stressed, not
necessarily of “best practices” (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982, David, 1985, Arthur, 1994) Indeed,
within this context the idea of “best practice” may be without analytical content.uncertainty and instability and calls forth new reactions and innovations
leading to further self-perpetuating economic change in a growing dynamic
system. However, these innovative competitive reactions have to be
financed either by borrowing or by the issue of financial liabilities that can
be honoured only if the innovations are successful in preserving the market
position of the firm. Thus the inherent uncertainty faced by the firm in a
competitive environment is extended to the financial assets held and trad-
ed by financial institutions and the public. Both finance and innovations thus
function as twin “levers of riches” and as uncertainty creators. Their inter-
play is at the root of the capitalist system’s twin operating features: tech-
nical progress and conflict.
3 (Schumpeter;1942 [1992] , Nelson and
Winter;1982, Burlamaqui, 2000a).  
Edith Penrose (Cf. 1959 [1995]) highlights the role of firms in creating an
internal environment shielded from the instability generated by the costs of
instability that Coase associates with market organisation. In an environ-
ment of competitive uncertainty, firms thus provide “pools of relative cer-
tainty” within which resources can be combined and coordinated in order
to react to external volatility and generate endogenous innovation. Firms are
thus not only more efficient in organising factors, they are more efficient in
developing new techniques to cope with change in an uncertain environ-
ment. This approach is also compatible with Richardson’s insights on how
the “development of capabilities” affects the “organization of industry” (Cf.
Richardson; 1972, and 1998).
4
If organisational structure is unique to each individual firm, then the inputs
organised in a managed process of production in a firm also acquire specif-
ic heterogeneous and non-replicable characteristics determined by precise-
ly how inputs are combined and coordinated (Cf. Penrose 1959 [1995]:
chapters 3 and 5). As a consequence the value of inputs should not be con-
sidered the result of their intrinsic characteristics or their value on the mar-
ket in alternative uses, but rather the result of the specific organisational
and management structure in which they are employed. For this reason,
inputs can never be perfectly substitutable and even if they are mobile, their
use cannot lead to replication of particular production processes since they
will possess acquired situational attributes that are firm specific. If the
7
3 A process wonderfully synthesized in Schumpeter’s celebrated phrase “creative destruction”.
4 Cf. Penrose :1959 [1995], Richardson, 1972 [1997],1998, and Winter, 1995. This approach is
also known as the resource- based view of firms and corporate strategy (Cf. Wernerfelt, 1984,
Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988, Prahalad and Hamel: 1990, Grant, 1991, and Foss ed; 1997).
Extensions of this approach may be seen as providing the groundwork for the development of a
“Schumpeterian” theory of the growth of firms. This theoretical bridge is in its infancy but can be
perceived for instance in Best, 1990, Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1992 , Montgomery ed: 1995 and
Beckett, 1996, and Collis and Montgomery :1998.resources are removed from one organization to another these acquired
attributes will be lost or simply not relevant in a different context.
5 It may
thus be extremely difficult for competitors using different organisational
structures to challenge the dominant position of a firm through replication
of resources and a firm’s position of dominance may be long-lasting at least
until another dominant organisational structure is developed
6 . 
2.2 Schumpeterian Competition, Resources and Rents
To emphasize the difference between the uniqueness of organisational
structure and its dynamic ability of innovate, we can define  the economic
advantages gained by Chandlerian innovative “first-movers” as a result of
creative destruction as “Schumpeterian rent”, and the organisation specific
value which is attributed to the acquired characteristics of inputs when
organised within a particular firm as a form of “Ricardian rent”.
7 The two
are inter-related in that the former is in principle bound to be dissipated by
innovation diffusion, while the latter could be long lasting if organizational
advantages can be protected from imitation. The  innovations and innova-
tive strategies that differentiate each firm from its competitors and create
Schumpeterian rents will be protected from erosion by imitation only if
attached to an effective protection of the organizational technique, while
the “organization based” Ricardian rents will be preserved only if it is pos-
sible to keep differentiating the organizational structure more rapidly than
competitors, who thus develop and “innovation dependence” on the mar-
ket leader .
In such an environment firms compete to attain market advantages; suc-
cess – or failure – in these strategies always results in asymmetries and
conflict, some grow and/or strengthen their technological and organization-
al capabilities, while others disappear or are reduced to marginal activities
8
5 A good example may be found in the engineering departments of East German manufacturing
firms. Cut off from replacement parts for their capital goods these departments eventually acquired
the expertise to replicate every part of complex capital goods. However, after German unification
and these State firms were privatised replacement parts were still unavailable, but they were not
needed since the capital stock was so outdated that it was scrapped and replaced by new capital
goods with readily available original replacement parts. The high skilled machine tool operators and
engineers thus became redundant, their skills valueless and they were unemployed.  
6 For a “Neo-Penrosian” perspective on firms and their strategic behaviour see Montgomery and
Wernerfelt, 1988, Prahalad and Hamel 1990,Glaister, 1996 p 97, Beckett, 1996, and Foss (ed):
1996.For a recuperation and extension of Richardson’s views on capabilities (he coined the concept),
see  Foss and Loasby ed.1998.
7 The parallel here would be between the unique fertility of  a piece of privately owned piece of land,
and the unique degree of “organizational fertility” attained by the cultivation of the land by a partic-
ular farmer. The proviso here is that those resources or collections of resources applied by the farmer
should be difficult to imitate (Winter,1995). Examples are patents, locations, production processes,
unique management,  learning skills, and, most of all, core capabilities that are generally knowledge
intensive and embedded in a high degree of tacit knowledge (Cf. Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, and
Foss, ed, 1996 on capabilities,  and Polanyi, 1967 on tacit knowledge )in the economic system. Competition is therefore the struggle for survival
and growth in a structurally uncertain environment (Cf. Nelson and Winter:
1982, parts 2 and 5). The objective is survival be means of the creation of
barriers to protect market advantages from “invasion” by both known and
potential (but not yet known) competitors; the strength of these barriers,
aside from those based on political advantage, springs from successful first
mover innovations in organisation of inputs in production. Above average
profits are then just a consequence of the competitive advantages created
by managerial and organisational strategies (Cf. Moss:1981, and the papers
collected in both Rumelt, Schendel and Teece ed:1995, and Dosi, Teece
and Chytry ed: 1998).   
The profits that result from a dominant market position are always under
threat from imitative strategies or innovative behavior of other firms and
thus can only be maintained by means of a process of continuous product
differentiation and productivity enhancement. The continuous competition
for profit provides the dynamic connection among innovations, market
structures and business and organisational strategies. Its major elements
can be condensed into the Schumpeterian idea that new products and
methods compete with old ones in changed conditions, which may mean
death of the latter; and that “to escape being undersold, every firm is com-
pelled to follow suit, to invest, and to accumulate” (cf. Schumpeter:1942
[1992] chapter 3:p. 32 ). 
This means that competition occurs not only in existing markets among
firms operating in the same sectors, but also among firms located in differ-
ent sectors or industries and for “future markets” whose roots are already
present only in the firms innovation strategies and technological expecta-
tions. Thus, competing firms are continually producing innovations and
technical progress that permanently destroys existing entry barriers by cre-
ating new ones that are challenged in their turn. This implies a relation of
cross-causality between innovation strategies and the reshaping of market
structures and the competitive process as a “leapfrogging game” (Cf.
Brenner: 1987, chapter 3). 
We may sum up by quoting Schumpeter: “These revolutions periodically
reshape the existing structure of industry [...] [constituting ] this process of
recurrent rejuvenation of the productive apparatus”“ (1992,p.68 emphasis
added). Competition is thus conceived not as an adjustment mechanism
(tending towards equilibrium) but as a powerful source of differentiation and
efficiency promotion as well as a vehicle for  uncertainty. Given these con-
ditions [...] “A monopoly position is in general no cushion to sleep on”. (Ibid.
p.102). In a free market environment the existence of permanent change or
“creative destruction” will produce a wide diversity of organisational tech-
niques as firms seek the most efficient methods to provide for and select
9the combination of material, financial and human resources with unique
strategies and learning mechanisms.
8 Instability, manifest in continuous
fluctuations in economic activity, unemployment, bankruptcies and struc-
tural transformations is then an endogenous feature of  the normal opera-
tion of competition in the economic system. Stability, therefore, is not an
inherent propriety of the system, but the result of socially and institutional-
ly constructed mechanisms designed to reduce or dampen instability (Cf.
Minsky, 1990, Crotty, 1994, Burlamaqui, 1995, chapter 2) .
2.3. Production and Finance
The evolution of the competitive process described above also applies to
the financial sector which is also capable of technological advance through
application of scale economies and concentration through competition in
activities capable of knowledge absorption. This helps to explain why
Schumpeter considered finance as the motor force that allows firms to
appropriate the resources necessary to introduce new technological inno-
vations that change the competitive conditions in industry and that lead to
the realisation of the gains due to scale economies (Cf. Schumpeter, 1934
[1997]), chapter 3, and 1939 vol 1, chapter 3)
9. 
Production and finance are intimately related by the financing of investment
in new production technologies embodied in fixed and working capital; thus
some of the benefits associated with concentration of production in knowl-
edge-specific activities must be attributed to the financial industry and any
argument made for protection to allow countries to develop particular
branches of such industries should also include means to develop an appro-
priate national financial structure that allows the expansion of these knowl-
edge absorbing sectors to take place (Cf. Christensen, 1992, Nelson ed,
1993). Thus, in the Schumpeterian view, finance plays the role of  the
handmaiden of  creative destruction that allows industry to produce tech-
nological advance and economic development. Indeed, financial institutions
10
8 In such an environment, the competitive tendency to imitation and replication which should lead
to equalisation of profit rates in fact produces permanent differentiation such that  no proportionali-
ty law between investments  and profits applies. Note that since they are all based on equilibrium
as a natural state, equalization of the rate of profits is an almost “sacred” assumption of the ortho-
dox canon, whether of the classical, Marxian, Neo-classical and neo-Ricardian variety.
9 Having said that, it seems also true  - and somewhat paradoxical –  that Schumpeter never really
took time to discuss financial innovation or gave it a similar status in his theoretical framework.
Although banks and finance were always at the center stage in his picture, neither product/process,
nor organizational innovation in the financial sphere are treated analytically (Susan Strange has
recently  made a similar remark. Cf Strange: 1998, chapter 2) .After all, in Schumpeter’s view, it
appears that innovation had to be backed by finance, but finance itself was not usually served by
innovation. This lacuna, it should be noticed, was fully inhered by the Neo-schumpeterian perspec-
tive. In the recently two volume set on “The Legacy of J. A. Schumpeter” collecting the most impor-
tant articles published by Scholars working in that tradition, there is only one paper dealing directly
with finance (cf. Hanusch ed: 2000).will also be subject to the same conditions found in manufacturing indus-
try, and driven by a competitive process based on entrepreneurial innova-
tions in knowledge absorbing activities (Cf. Heertje ed: 1988)
10.
In fact many of the characteristics that are attributed to specific types of
industry as peculiar to the production of  knowledge-based value-added are
also present in the provision of financial services. For example, a now stan-
dard explanation of the existence of banks is based on the advantages of
large scale operations. According to this approach banks acquire informa-
tional advantages concerning potential investment opportunities when they
specialise in the investment of depositors’ funds, they are thus more effi-
cient than individual households in earning returns on the placement of sav-
ings. These scale advantages extend to increased efficiency in monitoring
the performance of borrowers, and more recently to the process of finan-
cial engineering involving the unbundling of large indivisible investments for
sale to households. 
While this approach provides an example of the ways in which banks use
informational advantages, scale economies and innovations, it is less con-
vincing as an explanation of how banks differ from other financial institu-
tions since this interpretation of the activities of banks differs little from
those undertaken by money market mutual investment funds, with perhaps
the sole exception that they offer transactions and transfer facilities to their
clients and often provide price guarantees in terms of base money to depos-
itors on the value of the lending to the bank (although even these are often
offered by certain classes of money market funds, cf. Mayer, 1974). It
would thus appear that the basis of the informational activities that provide
advantages attributed to banks also characterise a much wider range of
financial institutions that do not provide transactions services usually asso-
ciated with the activities of banks.
Perhaps a better distinction would be one which separates those financial
activities that are directly linked to the financing of production activities and
those that are more concerned with simple exchange, or transactions in
goods already produced, or legal title to the goods of the future provision
of such goods. The distinction that we are trying to highlight here is not
concerning the knowledge-base of the two activities; they are both knowl-
edge-based. The distinction is that they rely on quite different types of
knowledge about different types of activity. These two different types of
knowledge-based activity may be seen in the different types of activity
11
10 This collection of essays is the exception in the Neo-Schumpeterian literature in recognising the
crucial role  of finance in Schumpeter’s work (Although not trying to integrate finance into the
inhered theory). Minsky on the other hand has repeatedly noted the affinity of Schumpeter and
Keynes’s view of finance (see, for instance, Minsky: 1986, p.113, and 1990). engaged in by the archetypal commercial bank: credit creation through lend-
ing to business firms in support of productive economic activity that aims
to increase total income and wealth, and the proprietary purchase and sale
of financial assets to benefit from pricing differentials that occur at a point
in time or over time with no impact on the absolute level of income.
11
Lending to finance production requires particular knowledge of the produc-
tion process, costs, and future market conditions for the products produced
by each firm to which credit is extended and thus of its prospects for repay-
ment, and is generally linked to the role of banks as creators of credit pro-
viding access of firms to resources as set out by Schumpeter in his Theory
of Economic Development (published in its first, German, edition in 1911).
This is the sort of activity Hyman Minsky describes in discussions between
the loan officer and borrower over the pro forma which tells the story of
how the bank is going to be repaid. It is activity that relates to the bank’s
loan book. 
On the other hand, the management of the bank’s proprietary investment
portfolio requires information about the formation and evolution of prices in
current and future periods in various types of securities markets and may
have no relation at all to the information required to make decision on lend-
ing to industrial borrowers. The motivation for such activity is, according to
the theory of efficient markets, based on the ability of arbitrage in free com-
petitive markets to eliminate any differences in the prices of identical titles
to expected future income streams traded as financial assets. The suc-
cessful arbitrager profits from the elimination of such differences by being
early to recognise them, while the successful borrower from the bank prof-
its from the organisational or managerial innovations that grant the firm a
dominant market position. 
Despite this similarity it is the lending to finance innovative production activ-
ity that creates the high return, knowledge absorbing sectors that produce
dynamic industrial growth (in the same vein, see Minsky: 1990; p 60-65).
The impact of financial arbitrage is limited to the static efficiency of the
competitive market process that forces uniformity in market prices and allo-
cation of given resources to their highest return uses. These two types of
knowledge-based activity carried out by most commercial banks when car-
ried to extremes are reflected in the two basic organisational forms charac-
teristic of financial institutions – relationship or house banking and compet-
itive market-based activity known as “transactional” banking. In the former,
12
11 In the financial sphere such trading may be beneficial to the extent that it provides liquidity in
financial asset markets, but the contribution of proprietary trading is usually greatest when markets
are buoyant and do not lack liquidity and least when markets are under pressure and traders are seek-
ing liquidity. the knowledge advantage possessed by the bank is of its clients’ produc-
tion activities and the potential profitability of these activities in producing
the earnings necessary to pay debt service and repay principal on the cred-
it advanced. This type of bank operation is usually associated with German
Kreditbanks, but US investment banks have historically played a similar role,
although in a slightly different context and on a reduced scale (cf.
Madeleine, 1943, Robertson, 1955, 1964, Hammond, 1967). Indeed,
German banks often employed engineers and scientists to help evaluate the
technology and thus the long-term prospects of borrowers to fully exploit
knowledge-based advantages.    
It is characteristic of relationship banking that it does not permit of free
market competition among banks for business since no firm would be will-
ing to give up proprietary information required for a banking relationship to
a financial institution if it thought the institution might be working for a
competitor in the near future. For full information sharing between the bank
and the borrower there  must be an understanding of confidentiality in the
treatment of information and thus of exclusivity in the services provided by
the bank. Neither would a firm be willing to offer to a number of compet-
ing banks all the information necessary to allow them to make competitive
bids for its business. On the other hand, financial arbitrage, which is the
basis of most of the transactions activities of banks is based on knowledge
of particular characteristics of the payment flows represented by financial
assets and their prices prevailing in the market, or of the prices that other
financial market participants expect to prevail at futures dates and places.
Thus one might say that the relationship bank is speculating on the nomi-
nal profitability of an innovative industrial process embodied in the firm that
it is financing, while in the second it is speculating on its ability to identify
anomalies in the efficient operation of the market mechanism and the abil-
ity of market competition to eliminate them.
In this regard it is important to remember that although financial institutions
have certain peculiar characteristics, usually linked to the regulatory envi-
ronment in which they function, they are nonetheless business firms and
will compete much like other firms. Thus, in the same way that the indus-
trial structure is driven by competition, financial institutions will seek to earn
profits from the exploitation and protection of their variously acquired
knowledge-based advantages. That is, organisational and production advan-
tages will produce dominant competitive positions which can only be chal-
lenged by firms that are capable of reproducing the new innovation, or per-
fecting another technique that is more profitable and more attractive to the
market (cf. Burlamaqui and Lagrota, 1998, part 5).
13As already mentioned, in financial systems where main banks or house
banks provide relationship services, there is a tacit agreement, as well as a
practical imperative, that banks do not compete for business. On the other
hand, in market-based systems where the required knowledge does not
cover information about clients, but about markets or instruments, these
new financial innovations present the possibility of rapid reverse engineer-
ing and thus competitive emulation providing for eminently contestable mar-
kets; financial institutions will thus seek to replicate financial instruments
and services offered to clients in order to compete for business.
This competition can take a number of forms, encompassing direct con-
frontation of competitors and the expansion of activities into other sectors
or other areas of the production process. For example, the process Chandler
(cf. 1990, 28 ff.) describes in which producers on reaching sufficiently
large scale expand to provide the organisation of wholesale and retail dis-
tribution of their outputs, thus internalising external markets and eliminat-
ing the wholesale and retail distribution firms that organised them, has a
counterpart in financial services. As the organisational ability of financial
firms increases with the introduction of new information processing tech-
nology, increasing economies of both scale and scope, they tend to inte-
grate additional services into their activities. There is thus an interaction
between financial institutions and industrial firms in which banks and other
financial institutions make it possible for firms to grow to the size at which
they can realise economies of scale and scope, while the creation of finan-
cial firms capable of this activity requires the evolution and concentration
of financial institutions and financial markets to a size that is sufficient to
achieve similar economies of scale and scope
12.  
In this regard Chandler’s contrast of the diverse role of finance in the cre-
ation of railways in the US and Germany (See box) is instructive:
“The rapid rail growth of the late 1840s and 1850s created in both countries
an unprecedented peacetime demand for capital. ...to nearly all the instruments
and institutions of modern American corporate finance. ...  In Germany, too, it
encouraged the creation of a wholly new financial intermediary, one that 
became central to the later financing of large-scale industrial enterprise. This 
new type was the Kreditbank.” (Cf. Chandler: 1990, 415).
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12 As yet, there is no equivalent to Chandler’s monumental study of the comparative evolution of
manufacturing firms for financial firms. However, the impact of these changes in the organisation of
financial firms on the operation of financial market are set out in two books by Martin Mayer
(Cf.1988, 1992).Chandler on Railway Financing in the US and Germany :
It is the legacy of J.P. Morgan’s activities in consolidating the railways that
the railway bond became the dominant investment asset on the New York
Stock Exchange until the 1914-18 war. Chandler attributes much of the dif-
ference in the financial institutions that financed the expansion of the rail-
ways in the two countries to the fact that German railways were nation-
alised by Bismarck, while in the US lack of government control and regula-
tion produced rampant duplication and wasteful competition in the indus-
try. This made the initial financing required to launch a railroad small, but
required the intervention of investment banks to oversee the process of
concentration and consolidation that ensured sufficient scale economies to
generate profits.
It is also the case that innovation in the financial sector has been given the
same protection traditionally practiced in industry to gain and protect
national advantage. A good example is British policy to prevent the estab-
15
“In Britain and the US before the end of the 1890s, the first movers in the new
industries rarely looked to established capital markets for funds. The initial capital
that was not provided by an entrepreneur and his partners came from local
investors, with some assistance from local financial institutions. In the US the first
large-scale funding of industrial enterprises by investment banking houses and
other financial institutions came only with the turn of the century merger move-
ment. And this funding was used to rationalize production and distribution facili-
ties and management organizations after the merger. Only in industries where
such rationalizing permitted enterprises to exploit fully the economies of scale did
the American financial institutions play a role in establishing modern industrial
enterprises. In Germany, on the other hand, banks did play a significant role in pro-
viding capital for new ventures to entrepreneurs making the investment necessary
to exploit the potential economies of scale and scope. In both Germany and the
US the funds provided by the financiers brought them into the decision-making
process as non-executive external members of the Board of Directors. Once the
new consolidated enterprises in the US and the managerial enterprises in Germany
were firmly established, the representatives of the financiers had less and less
influence on decisions concerning current operations and the allocation of
resources for future growth. Bankers preferred to remain bankers and to let indus-
trialists run the enterprises. Moreover, retained earnings provided industrial man-
agers with most of the funding needed to finance continuing growth.” (Chandler,
1990,597) lishment of note-issue banking in the British North American colonies
13.
As in industry, competition among individual financial institutions and nation-
al financial structures is generally based on technology producing the poten-
tial for achieving new economies in the production of financial services. We
hear much today about the revolution in information technology due to the
progress in communications and computing technology, but the introduction
of the clipper ship on the North Atlantic routes, of the telegraph to bridge
the Continental divide in the US, and finally the telephone were no less
important in terms of their impact on the provision of financial services. 
It thus seems clear that the arguments concerning the beneficial contribu-
tion to the commonweal of industry caused by its knowledge-based opera-
tions and by Schumpeterian competition also apply to the structure of the
financial services industry that provides the financing for the introduction of
new techniques by entrepreneurs in the industrial sector. 
3. Banks, Organizational Capabilities and Financial Innovation  
“Schumpeterian creation and destruction occurs in finance as well as in prod-
ucts and processes. The essential point of Schumpeter’s view of money and 
banks is that new combinations in production and in products could not appear
without being financed: finance and development are in a symbiotic relation. 
Restricting the Schumpeterian vision to technology or even industrial organiza-
tion misses the integrated character of Schumpeter’s vision” (Minsky, 1990) 
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13 The British government had already granted monopoly status to the Bank of England, who acted
quickly to extend this monopoly privilege to the issue of bank notes thus ensuring a monopoly on
this particular form of credit creation. The note-issuing banks formed in the British colonies in the
pre-Revolutionary war period were a response to the extreme scarcity of means of payment and to
provide clearing services for businessmen. In 1739 a note-issuing land bank was set up in
Massachusetts, providing a transatlantic challenge to credit creation by the Bank of England. The
British government declared  the bank  in contravention of the 1720 Bubble Act and when it was
not closed a special act was passed by Parliament in 1741 to extend the application of the Bubble
Act to the Colonies. As a result all the land bank’s outstanding notes were rendered legally null and
void, to the embarassment of the bank and its noteholders. 
This did not, however, stop the creation of note-issuing banks and in 1751 Parliament passed an
Act to outlaw such activities in Rhode Island, and another in 1764, to cover banks issuing notes in
the rest of North America outside the original British colonies.  Parliament passed additional legisla-
tion to forbid any issue of notes and bills and their use as legal tender money. This additional legis-
lation created much resentment in the colonies for, as in the case of the land bank, it was consid-
ered an ex post facto application of British legislation which had been formulated without the con-
sultation or representation of British subjects in the Colonies. It also meant that the colonies remained
totally dependent on Britain for means of payment and financial services, greatly impeding the eco-
nomic development of the colonies. This legislation was certainly as influential as the more famous
Stamp Act in provoking the rebellion against the British Parliament’s power to legislate over British
subjects in the colonies without allowing them representation in Parliament. Paradoxically but under-
standably, after Independence, many of the States incorporated the Parliamentary restrictions on
note issue into their own legislation in order to prevent individuals from issuing notes. Massachusetts
went so far as to incorporate the Bubble Act fully in its legislation” (Cf. Kregel, 1996).In Hyman Minsky’s view “A banker is always trying to find new ways to
lend, new customers, and new ways of acquiring funds, that is, to borrow;
in other words, he is under pressure to innovate”. (Minsky,1986, emphasis
added). This description of banking activity seems very similar to the action
of business firms described in the previous section. Indeed, banks have long
been analysed as business firms, but the knowledge and innovation aspects
highlighted in the approach of Coase Schumpeter, Chandler, Penrose and
others who have sought to build on the organisational advantages of firms
relative to market organisations do not seem to have been applied. 
As noted earlier, one of the standard explanations of the existence of banks
relies on the superior knowledge they acquire concerning investment oppor-
tunities not available to individual households seeking long-term outlets for
savings, but this aspect of the operation of commercial banks hardly seems
to distinguish them from other types of financial service provider or indeed
from manufacturing firms. In this respect it is interesting to note that both
Ford and General Electric have  been  leaders in particular sectors of  non-
bank financial services and have generally applied the same business prin-
ciples to their production and finance enterprises. It thus seems reasonable
to treat both manufacturing and financial firms, including banks, through
the same approach, exception taken for the differing degrees of govern-
ment regulation. The common ground applicable to both is the importance
of knowledge absorption as the basis of their activities aimed at ensuring
market dominance in an uncertain and unstable economic environment. 
3.1. Banks, Finance and Liquidity
As already mentioned, there are two aspects to the discussion of financial
firms which should be distinguished, both for analytical and for policy rea-
sons. The first aspect involves the crucial role played by financial firms in
providing manufacturing firms the credit required to engage in the compet-
itive process of creative destruction. The second is the evolution of finan-
cial markets as a result of the competitive behavior of financial firms them-
selves and the impact that this has on the ability of business firms to
finance new innovations. 
The first aspect exemplifies Schumpeter’s industrial or “Kreditbank” ideal
type of finance
14, and incorporates Minsky’s financial fragility framework in
which the interaction of business and financial firms adds an additional
dimension of uncertainty and instability to the analysis of the conditions of
continuous change faced by manufacturing firms. The second aspect still
remains to be fully explored, but will blend Schumpeterian competition in
17
14 This approach is shared by authors as diverse as Hilferding and members of the pre-monetarist
Chicago school such as Henry Simons, Lloyd Mints and Jacob Viner.organizational capabilities through creative destruction with an extension of
Minsky’s insights into financial innovation, in order to analyze competition
in the financial sector. This second topic will be rather different than the
analysis of the competitive process in the industrial sector due to the dom-
inant role played by government regulation of financial institutions and the
limits that this sets on the ways in which they may exercise competitive
innovations.
Minsky’s work belongs to the Post-Keynesian approach to economics, a
school, which takes money and finance (rather than technology or innova-
tion per se) as the most important features of the organization of a capital-
ist system, and that emphasizes the crucial importance of the concepts of
uncertainty and liquidity preference to understand both the multiple ration-
alities and the volatility that guide investment decisions, as well as their
implications for economic instability. Minsky’s approach emphasizes the
need to fully incorporate real world phenomena - and specially finance - into
the core of economic analysis, in order to be able to grasp the intrinsically
unstable nature of capitalist economies.
According to Minsky, modern capitalism could only be understood by
adopting the viewpoint of what he named “The Wall Street Paradigm”:
“Looking at the economy from a Wall Street board room, we see a paper
world - a world of commitments to pay cash today and in the future. These
cash flows are a legacy of past contracts in which money today was
exchanged for money in the future. In addition, we see deals being made in
which commitments to pay cash in the future are exchanged for cash
today. The viability of this paper world rests upon the cash flows (or gross
profits after out-of-pocket costs and taxes) that business organizations,
households, and governmental bodies receive as a result of the income-gen-
erating process” (Minsky, 1982, chapter 3, p. 63). 
However, in his vision, understanding money means understanding a vital
process shaping social evolution whose future course remains open-ended
and contingent. In this sense, Minsky’s theory should be taken as an essen-
tially institutionalist one, in the sense that he viewed the structure of the
economic world - much like his former teacher Schumpeter did  - not as
immanent in some set of underlying data – such as endowments or tech-
nology – but rather as constituted by a set of key economic institutions.
Money was one of them, in fact the most important of them. His way of
fleshing out that idea was to look at every economic unit – firms, house-
holds, governments and even countries – as though it were a bank daily
balancing cash inflow generated by a stock of assets against cash outflows
required to maintain the liabilities that were created in order to acquire those
assets (cf. Mehrling: 1998,15-16). From that point of view, categories such
as production, consumption, trade and investment first of all represents
18exchanges of stocks of real and financial assets which have particular mon-
etary flow characteristics and conditions attached to them. To put it blunt-
ly, money and finance are the most real aspects of capitalism, the ones
from everything else springs
15. 
In the logic of finance the most basic element of the economy is cash flow,
and the most basic constraint on the behavior of the economy is the “sur-
vival constraint” which requires that cash outflow not exceed cash inflow
(cf. Minsky: 1967, 157) if existing stock positions are to be maintained.
Because the exact coordination of payments is impossible, even this simple
constraint involves finance. From that perspective, finance and financial
relationships are fundamental because they oxygenate economic units,
allowing them to purchase without previous savings, and they make growth
and structural transformation possible, by providing current purchasing
power to those who would use it to expand the boundaries of the system.
However, in Minsky’s thinking, finance has a double-edge quality. The other
side of the above mentioned “positive” roles, is that finance allows eco-
nomic units to become illiquid in the present (by way of cash commitments)
in exchange for the possibility of recovering liquidity (plus profitability) in the
future (through the acquisition of assets whose expected cash-flows will
exceed the cash commitments entered into to acquire them). Thus finance
allows future commitments to be undertaken which may turn out to be
impossible to fulfill. The failure of expectations to be realised will then take
the form of liquidity crunches, or in worst case outcomes of insolvencies
and bankruptcies.
Subjectivity and volatility of expectations thus make financial asset prices
more volatile  than prices in other parts of the economy (Cf. Keynes: 1936
[1983] chapter 12, Strange: 1998). Secondly, given the inherent volatility
of financial asset values, liquidity provides an important  “protective device”
or “defensive strategy” to manage uncertainty. This is for two reasons. The
first is that since money is the unit of account its value is less volatile and
more certain in terms of other goods than other financial assets; it thus rep-
resents a refuge from price volatility. Secondly, it provides assurance that
future cash commitments can be  met with certainty. Thus firms may want
to hold cash cushions to make sure that they can meet recurrent cash com-
mitments when their income flows are subject to fluctuations. This is the
basis of Minsky’s theory of financial fragility (1990: p. 6): “The liquidity
preference schema of Keynes transformed economics into a study of inter
temporal relations: not only is the future now but the past is also now. After
19
15 In the words of Mehring (1998: 16): “The veil of money is the very fabric of the modern econo-
my”.Keynes, there was no reason to do economic theory that was presumably
relevant for a Capitalist economy without examining the relations in pro-
duction, consumption and finance that link yesterdays, today and tomor-
rows”.
Commercial banks face a series of risks, the most important being liquidity
or funding risks. Commercial banks fund their lending by borrowing from
the public through the issue of sight deposits which may be redeemed at
any time. If the bank has lent these funds to a commercial borrower it will
have to attract alternative lenders in order to avoid calling in loans. It may
not always be able to do so, and the fact that it may at times lack the liq-
uidity to repay liabilities and is unable to refund the lending by finding other
depositors is its liquidity or refunding risk. If the commercial bank is lending
to business it also faces credit risk, for the firms that have borrowed from
the bank may not be able to repay on a timely basis (i.e. they may have
become speculative finance units). The bank would then itself become the
equivalent of a speculative unit and face difficulty attracting additional
deposits as questions were raised about its ability to repay deposits. Finally,
if the bank has issued liabilities, on which it has made a commitment to pay
interest, to fund lending at interest, it must make sure that the positive dif-
ferential, or net interest margin, between the rate on its liabilities and the
rate on its assets is maintained. If the term or the reset rate of the interest
on the liabilities is shorter than that of the assets, the bank faces market or
interest rate risk. Should the rate it has to pay to attract funds rise above
the rate at which it has committed to lend, then a loan is subject to net
present value reversal and the bank will make losses and be unable to meet
its commitments.  
It is thus extremely important for a bank to present itself to its depositors
as a hedge financing unit that is able to make payments to its creditors on
demand with perfect certainty. This would seem to imply holding a cash
cushion against potential deposit withdrawals of 100% of the deposits, and
this would imply that the bank could do no lending (which is clearly not the
type of bank Schumpeter had in mind). If a bank does no lending, and does
not acquire any other assets, it’s earnings would be determined by the
charges that it makes to depositors for holding funds in safekeeping and
providing payment and transfer services. 
However, commercial banks do make business loans, so the question is
how it does this without  incurring unmanageable risks. The term “unman-
ageable” is very important here – it means without running the risk of
becoming a speculative unit and being unable to meet depositors requests
for withdrawal of funds. Thus, although banks will incur both liquidity and
credit risks, they seek to make them manageable by fully hedging these
risks (Cf. Kregel 1998 d, ch. 7). 
20We may see how this might be done by taking an ideal type commercial
bank that only makes short-term commercial and industrial loans of less
than 90 days that are over fully collateralised (i.e. the value of the loan is
some fraction of the anticipated realisation value of the collateral) against
goods in warehouse or contracts for sale of outputs. Thus, if a borrower
fails to repay, the bank takes possession of the goods and sells them for a
value that should be approximately equal to the amount of the loan if the
loan officer has properly valued the collateral. Loan should thus be less than
100 per cent of the total value of the property pledged as collateral. 
By making payments services available to its depositors banks also insured
that “deposit drain”, that is, the redemption of deposits, was reduced since
depositors withdrawing funds to make payments to other depositors in the
bank would require only a transfer from one account to another, without
the bank ever needing liquidity to make the payments. Bankers can calcu-
late with a reasonable degree of certainty (as reasonable as the mortality
tables used by insurance companies to predict life policy payouts)  the
amount of their total deposits that would “die” and have to be repaid in the
course of any given day. At the same time, the bank can arrange the tem-
poral distribution of its lending so that approximately the same proportion
of total loans were repaid each day as the cash turnover requirement.
Incoming loan repayments would thus roughly match maturing payments,
minimising the amount of cash that has to be available to meet cash out-
flows. 
Since these calculations are only statistical probabilities, they have a mar-
gin of error which is represented by daily variations in these flows above
and below the statistical estimates. Thus bankers have found that on fre-
quent occasion they may be required to meet net outflows of funds and a
cash cushion or liquidity reserve needed to be held to meet this contin-
gency. Usually this reserve against deposits has averaged much less than
10%. In the case that the value of collateral failed to cover the value of a
loan, the bank’s owners would have to use their pledged capital (which was
usually invested and thus also of lower realisation value than the balance
sheet value of the equity) or call as yet unpaid capital, which could also be
used to meet payments to depositors. Thus, for average daily operations a
bank could “safely” lend a relatively large multiple of  its capital and of its
deposits, with its risks fully hedged by the value of the collateral, its cash
reserve cushion and the bank owner’s capital. As a result, banks are usu-
ally very highly leveraged, with gearing and deposit multipliers well in
excess of 10 to 1, without being considered excessively risky. In this way
a bank could maintain a risky, but hedged balance sheet that would protect
it from the occasional encounter with “speculative” conditions in Minsky’s
sense. 
21However, hedging the risks of a highly leveraged balance sheet does have
costs in the form of opportunity costs since a main source of earnings for
the bank will be the difference between interest on loans and the costs of
funds and the multiple by which the bank can create deposits by lending in
excess of the amount of its borrowing from the public in the form of
deposits. To increase this ratio beyond that associated with hedging of risk
means increasing the probability that the liquidity and capital cushion will
be insufficient to meet repayment requests and a  liquidity crisis and a loss
of confidence which would soon produce insolvency and demands for
repayment that exceed reserves and capital resources. Thus banks also
face a trade-off between risk, and liquidity which translates into a tradeoff
between profitability and liquidity. 
Notice that the decision on how to hedge the various risks depends on the
subjective perception of these different risks and the values of the collater-
al pledged against loans; the type and degree of hedging will thus be rep-
resentative of the bank’s liquidity preference. A decision to expand credit
lending through additional deposit creation, other things being equal, is thus
a decision by the bank to reduce its liquidity cushion and either an explicit
decision to increase risk, or a subjective revaluation of the bank’s position
that reduces the perceived risks faced by the bank or increases the collat-
eral values pledged against loans. For example, a more optimistic evaluation
of the resale value of collateral will allow a bank to increase its lending with-
out increasing its perceived risk. However, this depends on the reliability of
the new estimate of collateral value. For example, Japanese banks gener-
ally grant loans on the basis of collateral valuation. As the property market
boomed after the Louvre Agreement in 1987 led the Japanese authorities
to reduce interest rates, Japanese banks either lent to or created their own
property companies, increasing their exposure pari passu with the rise in
prices which were bring driven up by the increased demand for property
caused by the purchases of the property companies. Since many of these
companies were quoted on the stock exchange, the increased lending to
property companies fueled a rise in their stock market value and the cre-
ation of investment companies which qualified for bank lending because of
the rise in the stock market value of the property companies. A vicious cir-
cle was thus created in which the banks fueled both a property and a stock
market boom without increasing what appeared to be fully hedged and thus
manageable risks. When interest rates were increased and the markets
turned in 1989, the banks’ exposures could not be reduced to restore col-
lateral coverage to acceptable levels and the loans effectively became val-
ueless.
223.2. Schumpeterian Competition and Financial Instability 
From a Schumpeterian point of view, competition in the financial sphere
should include the same forces of creative destruction implemented by
means of innovation, including innovation in organizational capabilities. The
institutional embeddedness of the whole process should also be acknowl-
edged, namely the dominant role played by government in the regulation of
financial institutions, and therefore, the crucial part played by policy meas-
ures.
Although financial institutions are driven by the same general motives and
objectives, there are some important similarities between financial and
industrial firms and the markets in which they operate. Just as the manu-
facture of physical goods, requiring physical productive activity and  time,
relies on the present commitment of resources which will produce outputs
to be sold under uncertain expectations of future market conditions,  finan-
cial markets create contractual commitments in the present which involve
future payment commitments which will take place in uncertain future con-
ditions. 
In general, the prices at which physical outputs will be sold are only deter-
mined at the time of sale, while the prices at which financial contracts can
be sold at future dates are determined in the present and must confront
uncertain actual future prices. Since little if any reliable information exists in
either case concerning the conditions that will prevail at future points in
time, expectations of profit or loss cannot be based on objective factors
since these objective conditions will only be produced by decisions which
are yet to be taken. The result will be expectations that are subject to
extremely volatile revisions over time, driven by both relevant and irrelevant
information, leading to substantial price instability. However, since produc-
tion decisions take more time and effort to adjust to changes in conditions
than financial contracts the revisions of decisions and thus the volatility of
prices will tend to be greater for financial contracts than for production deci-
sions. (Cf. Shackle, 1972 [1992], books III and VI, and Vickers, 1994 ).
But there are also important differences. For example, when financial insti-
tutions are competing aggressively they seek to maximise their market
share, but when they are faced with difficulties they restrict their market
expansion and compete for liquidity and/or, for solvency. As a result, com-
petition in banking carried an inbuilt tendency to underestimate risks when
the economy is expanding at a steady and seemingly predictable pace, and
to overestimate them when the economy is in decline. It is the former that
is more dangerous for the survival of the bank and is the additional source
of uncertainty and instability to that created by the competitive activity of
firms discussed above. In the United States, a process of banking compe-
23tition conforming to the characteristics suggested above culminated in the
stock market crisis of 1929 and the banking crisis of 1933 when a major-
ity of US banks became insolvent due to a liquidity crisis that turned into
insolvency, much as described in Minsky’s theory. Regulations were then
introduced which attempted to institutionalise the commercial bank and to
limit its operation in financial markets to transactions services and short-
term commercial lending, based on an application of the real bills doctrine
(Cf. Kregel, 1996, Chapter 5). 
For example, most countries have introduced formal regulations that impose
bank hedging through uniform standards for bank liquidity in the form of
compulsory reserve ratios and minimum capital ratios. Further, central
banks in some countries have accepted the responsability of acting as
lender of last resort to provide emergency funding by advancing credits
against a bank’s doubtful assets thereby allowing it to meet payment com-
mitments even when it is in a speculative position and cash flows do not
provide sufficient liquidity to meet depositor withdrawals. However, the
provision of refinancing by the central bank is not provided costlessly, and
is usually provided in exchange for banks accepting the application of  com-
pulsory reserve and capital ratios and is also made available at above mar-
ket interest rates that sharply reduce bank profits and represents an effec-
tive way for the Central Bank to limit credit expansion by reducing the prof-
itability of increasing lending and thus its attractiveness to banks. 
However, even government legislation to impose hedging on commercial
banks in the form of regulation could not protect commercial banks from
change and innovation as they faced competition from providers of finan-
cial services and to protect their market share they soon started to branch
out into term lending while competing financial institutions sought to pro-
vide transactions account to their clients in direct competition with com-
mercial banks. A competitive struggle thus took place between financial
institutions facing different types of  financial regulation. But, these regula-
tions limited competition and innovation to the detriment of commercial
banks and they became subject to loss of business to financial institutions
that were not so highly regulated. Much of their traditional lending to cor-
porate borrowers thus passed to more efficient forms of organisation, such
as commercial paper and money market mutual funds. This has meant that
what was once a bank’s most important source of earnings, the net inter-
est margin between borrowing and lending rates and the size of its deposit
multiplier, has been declining dramatically. To meet this shortfall in earnings
commercial banks have been forced into other areas of activity, such as the
provision of financial services to generate fee and commission income, and
to increase the use of their proprietary trading in financial assets (Cf .
Kregel, 1996, 1998).  
24As noted above, proprietary trading by commercial banks requires a totally
different type of information, present and expected prices of financial
assets and the conditions of their payment streams, to generate profits
from financial arbitrage. In this activity earnings are based on knowledge of
prices prevailing in the market, or of the prices that other financial market
participants expect to prevail. Thus one might say that it is a type of spec-
ulation on the efficiency of the operation of competitive forces in the mar-
ket to eliminate pricing anomalies.
The reason that commercial banks have had to expand their activities in
new directions is that the government regulations impeded their ability to
use financial innovation to expand net interest margins on their normal lend-
ing activity. In the United States in the 1970s savings and loan institutions
started to compete with banks  for transactions deposits by offering trans-
actions accounts that paid interest  plus a free toaster or mink coat depend-
ing on the size of the deposit while commercial banks remained restricted
to zero interest deposit accounts. Thus, innovation by banks has been pri-
marily in the form of counter-regulatory innovation. Since regulations apply
to reserve ratios and interest rates payable on deposit funds, innovation by
banks has involved seeking new sources of deposit funds that are not tech-
nically classified as deposits and this was the primary source of competi-
tive innovation in the 1970s and early 1980s (Cf. Mayer, 1974). Since the
introduction of capital ratios applied to risk weighted assets, innovation  has
involved creating new types of assets  that have lower risk weightings or
do not appear on bank balance sheets at all and thus do not require capital
at all. The result has been a rash of new product innovation in which banks
act as market makers in derivatives products.
Another competitive response to regulation was to shift activities abroad
where domestic regulations do not apply. The credit crunch and regulations
on capital flows introduced in the US during balance of payments and dol-
lar crises in the 1960s created incentives for US banks to shift some of their
borrowing operations out of the United States to “off shore” markets, pri-
marily London. In addition to providing new sources of dollar funding for US
banks, they provided an environment free of the segmentation imposed by
US bank regulation. Commecial banks could thus operate internationally
much like investment banks in the US, making many US bank global play-
ers, dealing in financial assets from around the globe. 
These new activities undertaken by banks represent substantially different
types of risk and different tradeoffs between risks and returns. Thus, banks
have in general been forced to change their activities in order to defend their
earnings and this has in all probability been associated with an increase in
risk. An average US commercial bank now generates roughly one third of
25earnings from lending on net interest margin, a third from its proprietary
trading portfolio and a third from fee and commission income. The latter is
especially important because it carries a zero capital charge and virtually no
liquidity or credit risk. Proprietary trading, on the other hand, carries large
price risks which banks have not traditionally been accustomed to manage
(Cf. Strange: 1998, chapter 2). 
Finally, much of bank lending is now being securitised into collateralised
loan obligations which the bank sells to final investors in order to move
loans off their balance sheets. This not only frees up bank capital, it also
generate fee and commission income from booking the loans and under-
writing and sales of the securitised packages which requires no capital allo-
cation. Lending to firms is being done increasingly through derivative pack-
ages arranged by banks and sold to bank clients, often with the bank itself
taking the opposite side of the hedges or providing subsidiary guarantees
that also appear as off balance sheet entries. Thus, the package of risks
undertaken by banks is changing rapidly as they innovate to enter new
activities to protect earnings, making it much more difficult to identify the
appropriate “margins of safety”. Further, much of the innovation involving
derivative contracts involves shifting risks. It is usually argued that this
process shifts risks to those who are most willing to bear them. But since
these contracts often make it more difficult to identify the true risk of an
instrument they do not always shift risks to those most able to bear them,
producing another type of instability into the system of Schumpeterian
competitive innovation.
3.3. Schumpeterian Competition, Derivative Contracts and Financial
Fragility 
Banks also offer derivative contracts to their clients in what is termed the
“over-the-counter” (OTC) market. But, there is no regulated “market”
involved in these contracts which consist of  highly complex combinations
of standard futures and options contracts stipulated on a bilateral basis to
meet the particular needs of clients. As already noted, the incentive to offer
these contracts arises from the fact that they do not involve direct lending
by banks to clients and since they often are executed through specialised
investment firms that are independently capitalised, they have the advan-
tage under the Basle capital adequacy requirements, of  requiring little or no
capital, or of being classified as off-balance sheet items because they do
not represent a direct risk exposure for the bank. In addition, they generate
substantial fee and commission income. Rather than committing capital, the
banks are simply intermediaries whose services involve not only matching
borrowers and lenders, but acting as market innovators creating investment
vehicles that attract lenders and borrowers. Nonetheless, these activities
often require banks to accept some of the risks associated with the deriv-
26atives created to produce packages with the characteristics desired by final
borrowers and lenders.
16
The major objective of active, global financial institutions is thus no longer
the  maximisation of  profits by seeking the lowest cost funds and chan-
neling them to the highest risk-adjusted return, but rather in maximising the
amount of funds intermediated in order to maximise fees and commissions,
thereby maximising the rate of return on bank capital. This means a shift
from continuous risk assessment and risk monitoring of funded investment
projects that produce recurring flows of interest payments over time, to the
identification of riskless “trades” that produce large, single payments, with
as much of the residual risks as possible carried by the purchasers of the
derivatives package. As a result, the efficient international allocation of
investment funds to the highest risk-adjusted rate of return depends
increasingly on assessment of risks and returns by the lender. Yet, it is the
role of most derivative packages to mask the actual risk involved in an
investment, and to increase the difficulty in assessing the final return on
funds provided.
17 As a result, certain types of derivatives may increase the
difficulties faced by private capital markets in effectuating the efficient
transfer of risks to those best able to bear them. By extension, if they make
investment evaluation more difficult for primary lenders, they may also cre-
ate difficulties for financial market regulators and supervisors.
An example of how the risk characteristics of an asset may be clouded by
the complexity of its structures would be a US government agency dollar
denominated structured notes with the interest payment, or the principal
value, linked to an index representing some foreign asset. The return to
these notes would be higher than US domestic rates, but the increased yield
would be accompanied by the increased risk due to foreign exchange expo-
sure. Such an asset might be a one-year dollar-denominated note paying a
guaranteed above-market interest rate, but with the amount of repayment
of principal linked to an  index, say the Thai baht/dollar exchange rate. Since
the asset is denominated in US dollars, and the interest is guaranteed and
paid in US dollars, the notes carry an investment grade credit rating and
would be entered on the balance sheets of investors as the equivalent of  a
US Treasury or Agency security, not as a foreign investment subject to for-
eign exchange or country risks. 
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16 These derivative risks may or may not be hedged by the bank, depending on its own proprietary
investment strategy. When hedging does occur it can be done either by physical hedging (i.e. the
actual purchase of an offsetting position in the underlying financial asset),  through the purchase of
derivative contracts in organised markets, or by producing a package which involves risks which off-
set those involved in other packages (cross hedging or risk matching across clients). 
17 For example, Chew (1996, p. 57) observes that  “Structured notes are the epitome of how invest-
ment technology helped and continues to help money managers circumvent guidelines that were
framed to protect the interest of small, unsophisticated investors.”The above-market return could be created by lending the principal sum (less
the amount required to buy a one-year Treasury bill which will provide the
guaranteed dollar interest payment at the maturity of the contract) directly
to a Thai bank by buying a bank acceptance. If the baht/$ exchange rate
remains constant the Thai baht interest and principal repayment can be con-
verted at maturity to a dollar value equal to the original investment of prin-
cipal, leaving an excess over the US rate equal to the differential between
Thai and US interest rates. However, if the baht devalues relative to the dol-
lar, then the dollar amount available to repay will fall below the original
investment. The buyer thus has the entire principal at risk related to the
baht/$ interest rate, and only the interest is guaranteed. The contract
arranged in this way would provide Thai banks with below market rate
funds, provide US investors with above market returns (eagerly sought
because US rates were in decline from 1991 to 1993) and the banks with
fees and commissions for arranging the trade, but with no commitment of
capital (most US banks were emerging from the experiences of the real
estate crisis of the 1980s and were seeking to rebuild capital). 
It is virtually impossible for the US investor to evaluate the use of the funds
made by the Thai bank, and there is little incentive for the US bank  to do
so, since once the structured note issue is sold, the foreign credit and for-
eign exchange risks are borne by the US investor. The investor is  not only
subverting prudential controls (on its balance sheet these assets would be
classified as exposure to a US entity, with investment grade credit risk), but
is in all probability evaluating the return without any adjustment for the for-
eign exchange risk, even if that risk is recognized as such. There is thus lit-
tle economic interest or possibility for the market to either assess the risk
or the returns of the investment and thus there can be no guarantee that
these risks are being borne by those most willing and able to bear them. 
Regulation has thus meant that the major form of Schumpeterian competi-
tion in financial sectors has been competitive innovation against different
regulatory classes of financial institutions (e.g. savings and loans versus
commercial banks, commercial banks versus investment banks). This activ-
ity has been concentrated on innovations in creating sight liabilities that
were exempt from required  reserve in the 1970s and in innovations to cre-
ate assets that had reduced risk weighted capital requirements in the
1990s. But, within each regulatory class, the competitive pressure is
extreme since the products that a bank uses to decrease its required
reserves or regulatory capital in order to increase its earnings are easily repli-
cated through reverse engineering, being based on techniques that are gen-
28erally known in the markets and are sold publicly to clients.
18 Financial prod-
uct innovation diffusion occurs almost instantaneously, since patent pro-
tection is difficult to attain and information is rapidly diffused (by product
imitation) among institutions.
So, on Schumpeterian terms the profits from being a first mover are
ephemeral and difficult to monopolise –once created, they almost instanta-
neously evaporate through imitation (Cf. Burlamaqui and Lagrota, 1998,
part 5, Burlamaqui 2000 b, pp 12-19). Therefore, continuous product inno-
vation is required for banks to create surplus profits, conquer new clients,
and improve competitive position against other banks. But since it cannot
protect these gains the major movement in competitive innovation has been
a process of rapid bank consolidation as it is easier to buy competitors than
to gain a dominant advantage over them, hoping in the process to expand
on the basis of economies of scale and scope. This is occurring both with-
in regulatory classes, with the creation of large regional bank groups, and
across classes as banks seek to defend themselves from competition from
other regulatory classes by forming groups that cut across regulatory lines.
The result has been that finally in 1999 US banking legislation has been
approved that removes the regulatory classification that has driven much of
the competitive activity in the financial sector over the last thirty years,
opening the way for consolidation across different product lines or banking
functions.
It should be clear by now that innovative strategies in the banking system
play a crucial role in shaping and re-shaping its tendency towards financial
fragility, and complement Minsky’s explanation of financial fragility which
was based on the endogenous creation of instability through the reduction
in risk assessments in tranquil times and the ability of banks to innovate to
reduce reserve requirements and capital requirements by providing the moti-
vations for these financial markets innovations that result from the com-
petitive strategies crafted by the banking system.
The current trend of concentration in banking may be better understood
from Chandler’s explanation of the way industrial concerns expand to
organize wholesale and retail distribution, competing those firms out of the
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18 Two examples make this point. The well known negotiable CD, offered to business clients by
First National City Bank, was developed and marketed by Walter Wriston who is said to have become
head of City Bank as a result, but it was quickly offered by all commercial banks to their clients. The
use of securitisation of bank assets through the creation of special purpose vehicles was pioneered
by Salomon in mortgage banking after the collapse of the savings and loan banks, but was soon
extended to all  assets, including C and I loans and is now employed by all banks. Nonetheless, first
movers usually tended to retain advantages because even though the techniques were rapidly repro-
ducible, the human skills were not and replication usually involved the poaching of first mover bank
personnel by competitors.market, as well as production. Financial institutions have been involved in
a similar process. The process Chandler outlined in his book on Scale and
Scope (cf. Chandler: 1990, passim) shows primary industrial producers
expanding to size that is sufficient to allow then to undertake the distribu-
tion functions that were previously offered by wholesalers pooling the dis-
tribution of several producers, and finally of retailers who offered similar
services to a number of producers. If the firm is seen as an alternative to
market organisation, then the incorporation of the various aspects of retail
and wholesale markets represents the internalizing and thus the elimination
of the market as the organising principle of these activities as well as the
elimination of the wholesale and retail distribution firms that had organized
these external markets. 
A similar process occurs in financial markets as their organizational ability
increases with the introduction of new information processing technology,
increasing economies of both scale and scope (Cf. Chandler, 1990, con-
clusion). There is thus an interaction between financial institutions and
industrial firms in which banks make it possible for firms to realise
economies of scale and scope, while the creation of large scale firms
requires the evolution and concentration of financial institutions and finan-
cial markets to a size that is sufficient to achieve similar scale economies. 
It is thus the operation of the forces of competition that creates the uncer-
tainty and risk that are a natural part of the Schumpeterian process of com-
petitive innovation and creative destruction. As seen, the use of financial
innovation in providing the financing of innovation in business also involves
a decrease in transparency concerning the risks that are being borne in the
system. While this is a process that is linked to new innovations, there is
also a natural process of competition that brings about an increase in risk
and financial fragility that is independent of the competitive process in the
financial sector. These are considered in the next section.
4. Financial Fragility and Macroeconomic Instability 
“The financial instability hypothesis is an alternative to the neoclassical syn-
thesis, i.e., to today’s standard economic theory. It’s designed to explain insta-
bility as a result of the normal functioning of a capitalist economy. Instability 
of financial markets - the periodic crunches, squeezes, and debacles - is the 
observation. The theory is constructed so that financial instability is a normal 
functioning internally generated result of the behavior of a capitalist economy”.
(Minsky, 1978)
For Minsky the indebtedness created when firms borrow from banks to
make innovative changes provides another facet of the explanation of why
the environment in which both firms and banks operate is subject to change
and instability Instead of emphasising competitive innovation and uncer-
30tainty, Minsky emphasises the relationship between indebtedness created
by borrowing to finance innovation and uncertainty as crucial to the con-
cept of financial fragility. As already mentioned, for Minsky, as well as for
Schumpeter, debt financing is the very logic of capitalist production, and it
is the prerequisite of the competitive activity to preserve dominance in an
environment of change through continuous innovation
19. Minsky’s “Wall-
Street Paradigm” develops a theory of endogenous macroeconomic insta-
bility by connecting the dynamics of debt structures and interest rates. It
can easily be extended to the international context of a Global Capital
Market paradigm by recognising that exchange rates are similar to debt con-
tracts and will be directly related to interest rate differentials (Cf. Kregel,
1998 a)
4.1. Debt Structures and Financial Fragility
Minsky’s analysis is based on the sustainability of cash flows generated by
the borrowing that firms must do to create the assets needed for competi-
tive innovation. Borrowing the concept of a “margin of safety” from
Benjamin Graham, one of the originators of hedge fund investment, Minsky
defines three balance sheet configurations: hedge, speculative and Ponzi.
The asset side of a “Hedge” balance sheet produces expected cash inflows
from new innovations that always exceed their financing costs and operat-
ing expenses, including dividends for shareholders on the liability side of the
balance sheet, by a sufficient “margin of safety” or cushion capable of
absorbing any unforeseen changes in cash inflows and outflows. If the cash
or liquidity cushion covers, say, 2.33 standard deviations of the historical
data on past gross operating returns, then the firm would be unable to meet
its cash flow commitments on average only one time in one hundred. A
company that is expected to meet its payments with 99% probability is
close to what the banker considers a risk-free loan.
As the cushion of safety declines, the probability of being unable to meet
cash flow commitments rises;  there will be a point at which it is 99% prob-
able that there will be some future periods in which the cushion will not be
sufficient to enable the firm to meet its payment commitments.
Nonetheless, the cumulative cushion over the life of the loan may be suffi-
cient to cover them, so that the project has a positive expected net pres-
ent value. The firm may need an additional extension of short-term credit
on occasion to meet its cash payments, but by the end of the project the
loan it will have been fully serviced. This is what Minsky calls a “specula-
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19 From the above discussion, it seems safe to say that the “financial fragility” framework and the
evolutionary perspective in economics share the same core assumptions, way of theorizing, and key
results. It is, therefore, quite puzzling how they traveled the same roads and fought the same ene-
mies without ever borrowing from each other or, better, without forging a “strategic theoretical
alliance”. Of course this is one of our main claims in the paper.tive” financing position, for both the banker and the borrower are speculat-
ing that by the end of the project there will be enough money to repay the
loan, even though there may have been shortfalls along the way. A loan
officer of a bank that has good expertise in credit assessment will accept
such loans
20.
Finally, when the cushion of safety is non-existent and there is a high prob-
ability of shortfalls in nearly every period, the firm may have to borrow addi-
tional funds just to be able to meet current commitments. This Minsky calls
“Ponzi” financing, making reference to a well-known post-war pyramid
investment scheme. These are companies that need to increase their bor-
rowing just to stay in business, but to which, according to the aphorism and
good credit assessment, bankers should not lend under any circumstances
(Cf. Kregel, 1997c)
21.
Building of the analysis of both Keynes and Schumpeter Minsky notes that
in a capitalist economy in which the future cannot be predicted and is sub-
ject to unforeseen change for the reasons given in the previous sections,
the value of the hedge and speculative financing positions put in place by
bank lending will change with variations in the overall macro behaviour of
the economy. For example, a change in economic policy that produces a
rise in interest rates has two effects on firms’ financing  positions. First, it
reduces the present values of the expected cash flows from operating the
projects. Second, it increases the cash flow commitments for financing
charges if interest rates are set on an adjustable or rollover basis. 
4.2. Financial Liberalization, Financial Innovation and Reinforced Financial
Fragility
It is quite easy to extend this analysis to firms operating in a global context.
For example, a firm producing outputs that require a high proportion of
imported inputs, or that relies on export sales for a large proportion of its
revenue, or finances production by foreign borrowing, a depreciation in the
exchange rate will have the same effect on cash flow commitments as an
increase in interest rates. In addition, estimated cash flows will be revised
downwards if import costs rise by the full amount of any depreciation in the
exchange rate, while export prices in foreign currency are reduced in an
attempt to increase market share or stimulate rapid sales. For countries
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20 It is worth noticing that for Schumpeter the bankers were the real capitalists in Bourgeois socie-
ty and that they shared with entrepreneurs what Keynes would term animal spirits( Cf. Schumpeter:
1934, chapter 3). In Minskyan terms, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs were always speculative units,
and true Schumpeterian entrepreneurs should be quasi-ponzi units.
21 In that sense, for Ponzi units profits expectations are solely based on the resale of assets at high-
er prices (or, as a flow, profits would be based on the extent that the referred pyramid investment
schemes are able to reproduce themselves).operating in an open trading system these two exogenous changes usually
occur together and reinforce each other since higher interest rates are often
used to defend a weak currency and to stabilise a currency after devalua-
tion. Cash cushions or margins of safety would thus have to be larger for
firms operating in countries with open capital markets and uncontrolled cap-
ital flows (Cf. Kregel, 1997c and 1998a). 
For some borrowers the cushions of safety will not be sufficiently large to
cover exogenous changes in both interest rates and exchange rates and
may be sufficient to transform them directly from “hedge” finance units into
“Ponzi” finance units. The result is an overall increase in the lender’s cred-
it risk on outstanding bank loans, since the borrower’s cushion of safety is
now smaller. There is also an increase in borrower’s risk for the firms as
they find it more difficult to realise their initially expected cash flows. The
fragility of the domestic financial system thus increases with either a rise in
interest rates, or a depreciation of the currency. 
Obviously, this same reasoning can be applied to domestic banks that are
allowed to borrow and/or lend in international capital markets. They will
require higher cushions of safety to cover the possibility of changes in inter-
national interest rates or the exchange rate. But, a bank with international
operations is in an even more exposed position. A rise in interest rates and
a depreciation of the exchange rate not only reduces the present value of
its cash flows from domestic assets represented by the interest payments
received from its outstanding domestic loans and increases the interest
costs of its foreign funding, it also reduces the credit quality of its internal
loans and thus reduces its own credit rating as a borrower. It will thus have
to pay higher credit spreads on its domestic and international funding which
it will be unable to recover through higher interest rates charged to its
domestic clients. If the change in rates is sufficiently large banks may also
find themselves suddenly in the condition of a Ponzi unit in which cash
inflows no longer cover cash outflows, and the value of assets no longer
provides cover for its liabilities for any future date. The net present value of
the bank falls below zero and it becomes technically insolvent.
The natural response of a banker to such conditions would be to cut down
on funding costs by reducing lending to firms that are classified as hedge
and speculative units and by calling in all lending to Ponzi financing units.
As noted, the special characteristics of speculative and Ponzi firms is that
they need increased finance from the banks just to stay in business. But,
the bankers may have no choice but to cut off support if the banks them-
selves have become Ponzi units; they may be forced to reduce their lend-
ing because their own funding sources refuse to roll over or extend credits.
Obviously, domestic banks will also be unwilling to lend to each other, so
33the domestic interbank market will also contract, leading to a generalised
difficulty in completing payment of current cash commitments and a liquid-
ity shortage. As both firms and banks attempt to reduce their foreign cur-
rency exposure, market imbalances may occur, leading to a breakdown in
the foreign exchange market as well. As a result a financially fragile system
may be transformed into a financially unstable system. 
In such conditions, Ponzi financing firms have no choice but to reduce their
own cash outflows, delaying current payments to suppliers, cutting back on
expenditures, and by attempting to raise cash in any way possible which
means by selling out inventories, and what output they can continue to pro-
duce with current inventories of inputs, at distress prices. If this is insuffi-
cient to cover cash flow needs, they will be forced to sell any other assets
they may have, or to generate liquidity by suspending current investment
projects or even selling capital equipment. They will also layoff or fire work-
ers who represent a cash drain. The result, in contradiction to Say’s Law of
Markets, is a generalised condition of excess supply in all markets, placing
downward pressure on prices of both output and assets. 
Such conditions appear peculiar because generalised excess supply will also
be accompanied by declining overall demand (which is usually thought to
rise when prices fall) as a result of the suspension of investment expendi-
tures by firms whose balance sheets have reached Ponzi conditions, the
general decline in investment due to the tightening of monetary policy, and
the fall in consumptioncaused by the fall in household incomes and
increased unemployment. This will place additional pressure on short-term
money markets, and may even push short rates upwards as credit condi-
tions deteriorate, current payments are delayed and more financing units
seek temporary financing to keep operating.  
There are any number of factors which might generate the scenario just
outlined. Rather then being produced by exogenous changes in economic
variables that render cushions of safety insufficient to insure stable expan-
sion, an endogenous process may lead to an underestimation of the risks
associated with innovative  investment plans and thus to the provision of
cushions of safety that are too thin. This may occur in periods of sustained
economic stability in which the weight of persistent past positive experi-
ence increases the expectation of future success, and the memories of past
crises fade from the collective memories of both bankers and managers as
borrowers and lenders. Alternatively, epochal Schumpeterian technological
changes may generate increases in optimism concerning the profits from
applying the new technology. 
Whether it is a reduction in risk assessments due to extended tranquil con-
ditions or an increase in the expectation of earnings due to the introduction
34of a new technological epoch, the resulting reduction in the mathematical
expectation of possible loss will lead to a reduction in the cushion of safe-
ty that had previously been thought prudent . Usually both of these process
work together, a “stable environment” is usually characterised as a period
without major external shocks (Cf. Kregel, 1998 a, 1998 b) or new tech-
nology provides rapid increases in returns to first movers that are extrapo-
lated across other industries. Thus cushions of safety are reduced along
with the lowered expectations of negative shocks or the increased expec-
tation of above average returns which soon become considered as average.
Usually the external shocks are identified in terms of changes in sales or
financing conditions while the new technological epochs may be the intro-
duction of steam power, or railroads (cf .Chandler’s analysis of railroads
quoted above) or the recent telecommunications / e-commerce revolution. 
As noted above, changes in exchange rates may have a similar impact to
changes in interest rates. Thus, a period of prolonged exchange rate stabil-
ity may also lead to over optimistic assessments of the stability of the
domestic currency values of foreign commitments and similar reduction in
margins of safety relating to foreign cash commitments or inflows. This
endogenous change in margins makes the passage from a fragile to an
unstable system that much more rapid in the event of an exogenous shock.
However, ever period of tranquility is eventually interrupted and not every
technological revolution produces a generalised increase in returns in all sec-
tors, so that expectations are eventually disappointed and the combination
of events in which rising supplies and falling prices leads to a collapse in
demand (rather than demand increasing with falling price as in the tradi-
tional analysis) is what Irving Fisher called a “debt deflation” process.
Minsky’s extension of the process places more importance on the fact that
the rising credit risks that result are reflected on bank balance sheets in the
form of increased charge-offs and a general decline in asset quality which
will eventually place some banks in difficulty as their capital cushion is over-
whelmed by loan losses, and a full fledged financial panic is set off. This
spread of fragility from the productive to the banking sector characterises
the passage from financial fragility to financial instability and crisis. 
Summing up, periods of sustained, stable expansion or of the rapid intro-
duction of new technology in open capitalist economies with sophisticated
financial systems will endogenously generate financial fragility as margins
of safety are reduced. “Destabilizing stability” is a nice shortcut used by
Minsky himself to frame this situation (Minsky: 1986, introduction).
In Minsky’s view, capitalist economies have an inherent tendency to
increasing leverage and financial vulnerability which leads sophisticated
35financial systems to be biased towards financial fragility. This financial
fragility framework proposed by Minsky is integrated into the competitive
behaviour of banks discussed above by nothing that banks are willing to
increase their lending to more highly leveraged companies when creative
destruction and competitive innovation or the introduction of new tech-
nologies takes place in a climate of sustained economic expansion, but to
drastically revise their credit ratings on these companies when they face dif-
ficulties in meeting their interest payments due to failure of a particular inno-
vation or of overall demand, reducing lending or even calling in loans, as
soon as they suspect that their debtors can face solvency problems. 
From a dynamic Schumpeterian point of view, and as already mentioned,
this behavior can be expressed in the observation that when banks are
strategizing aggressively in a stable expansion they compete for market
share by increasing the volume of their lending and usually can only do this
by extending facilities to more aggressive innovators which reinforces the
process of endogenous change and inherent market instability as well as
increasing their risk exposures and reducing their cushions of stability, and
when they are strategizing conservatively they compete for liquidity and/or,
for solvency, thereby driving their borrowers into more unstable balance
sheet positions and increasing instability. This standard strategy of banking
industry behaviour thus contributes to reinforcing financial instability what-
ever the strategy adopted. 
Since bankers will lend against the value of the security pledged against the
loan or against their expectations of the future cash flows to be generated
by an innovative project their lending will be influenced by their subjective
assessments of the value of the underlying security or the profitability of a
project. When conditions are good and expectations are optimistic, valua-
tions of security will be raised and more lending will take place. As George
Soros (1987, p. 81) has pointed out, this process is self-reinforcing since
the very act of lending by the bank may change expectations and thus the
“fair” value of the collateral used to secure the loan. Lending may increase
the value of the collateral and thus appear to reduce the credit risk associ-
ated with lending to the firm while it also appears to reduce the risk expo-
sure of the bank. On the other hand, a firm that fails to attract bank loans
may have to enter into distress sales or reduce activity, thereby reducing
the value of its assets pledged as collateral against outstanding loans. There
will thus be a tendency for the effective risk undertaken by banks to
increase in expanding conditions.
Minsky’s original analysis of the passage from financial fragility to financial
instability is based on a change in domestic monetary policy or the persist-
ence of stable domestic conditions. But, as seen above, the analysis is eas-
36ily extended to a period of Schumpeterian technological revolution or an
exogenous exchange rate shock for companies operating in open trading
systems and to banks borrowing and lending in international money and
capital markets. With increasingly interdependent capital markets and
increased capital flows, the impact of a change in monetary policy would
then have to be extended to a change in the monetary policy of the largest
international lenders.  
Changes in interest rates of the major international lenders, especially the
US and Japan, have been especially important in creating financial instabil-
ity in developing countries during the debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s,
and their impact on exchange rates has been a major factor in the 1997 ‘s
Asian crisis. However, that crisis has been exacerbated by an additional ele-
ment: the conditionality imposed on the borrowers seeking support from the
multilateral agencies (Cf. Kregel, 1998 a, 1998 b and 1998 c, for exten-
sions of those arguments).
As noted above, the normal scenario for a developing country financial cri-
sis would involve domestic firms borrowing in foreign currency from foreign
banks at interest rates which are reset at a short rollover period. Note that
it makes little difference if the loans have a short or long maturity, the point
is the change in interest costs on cash flows produced by the short reset
interval for interest rates. Short reset periods mean that a rise in foreign
interest rates is quickly transformed into an increased cash flow commit-
ment for the borrower, instantly reducing margins of safety. If the change
in international interest rate differentials leads to a depreciation of the
domestic currency relative to the borrowed foreign currency, then the cush-
ion of safety is further eroded by the increase in the domestic currency
value of the cash commitments and the principal to be repaid at maturity. 
Finally, if the government responds to the weakness of the domestic cur-
rency in international markets by increasing domestic interest rates in order
to stem currency speculation or to attempt to attract foreign demand for
the currency, domestic demand may be adversely affected and domestic
cash flows will be reduced and domestic financing costs will be increased.
Firms may thus pass rapidly from hedge financing to Ponzi finance units as
the result of a rise in foreign interest rates. Whether this increase in finan-
cial fragility turns to instability and crisis will depend on the willingness of
foreign banks to extend additional foreign currency lending  to cover the
payment shortfalls on current commitments. If foreign banks follow the
bankers’ aphorism, they may be unwilling to do this. 
As a result, firms may be forced to attempt to improve their foreign earn-
ings by increasing foreign sales. But, this usually leads to falling prices in
international markets which compounds the losses from depreciation of the
37exchange rate, and any cutback in domestic operations simply makes
domestic demand conditions worse. The knock-on or contagion effect thus
hits both the domestic financial system and the foreign banks, who now
have increasingly dubious loans on their books. If both foreign and domes-
tic banks’ capital cushion is insufficient to absorb the losses, then fragility
turns to global systemic instability. In any case, the initial shock, as well as
the recommended policies, combine to increase fragility and thus make
instability possible in any exchange rate crisis.
The impact of technological change on the fragility of the system can be
seen in the current behaviour of financial markets where new electronic
commerce companies with no earnings history and no current expectations
of positive profits are funded by banks and venture capital firms in the
expectation of floating the shares in an initial public offering on the stock
market at substantial profit. After their public issue of stocks these compa-
nies continue to trade at substantial multiples of earnings when they have
them, but many continue to report losses. However, this phenomenon is
not exactly new. As happens in any technological revolution, major inno-
vations inflict shake-ups into the business landscape. These new companies
resemble the development of railroads in the last century. It is clear that
there is duplication and all cannot succeed. Although there is no J. P.
Morgan to oversee the consolidation process, those that are expected to be
successful are taken over by already existing firms thus validating their
stock market valuations. It is thus the expectation of profit from an IPO and
then from a takeover that drives the valuation process, not the expectation
of earnings.
Current activity in financial markets offers a case in point. A recent Lehman
Brothers stock analysis of Amazon highlights its “weak balance sheet, poor working
capital management, and massive negative operating cash flow” (summarized in The
Guardian, June, 27, 2000). The company has more than $ 2.1 billion of bond debt sup-
ported by 25.6 million of equity and around 20% of the company’s assets consist of
balance-sheet “goodwill”, sums that are evaluated as the result of a company acquiring
another for more than it is worth, writing off the difference against earnings. Thus, hun-
dreds of millions of dollars of income are being used simply to service the company’s
enormous debt. This may be called a Ponzi balance sheet. From Minsky’s point of
view many such firms may start out as speculative units but become Ponzi
units if expectations of a takeover decline. They can only avoid this fate if
they become part of an already existing firm that has positive earnings and
thus a speculative balance sheet. Thus any change in expectations or in
monetary policy making the takeover of new profitless firms less likely will
bring about abrupt changes in market valuations such as were seen in the
recent fall of around 40% in the NASDAQ index. 
385. Policy Perspectives on Finance and Development
“With the recognition of uncertainty as a deep attribute of real world economies
the simplistic propositions of ‘laissez faire’ no longer hold. Economies with the
financial system of modern capitalism can implode, as happened between 
1929-33”. (Minsky, 1996)
“What we need today is the same kind of pragmatic approach to public policy
problems that Keynes offered in his own days” (Rodrick, 1997)
The historical point of reference for Schumpeter’s view that the growth
dynamic of the economic system depends on its financial system providing
a means for the most dynamic entrepreneurs to obtain resources from the
dying, static parts of the economy in a process that he called “creative
destruction” was the German Kreditbank or “mixed bank”. Although these
joint-stock banks played an active role in financing German industrialization
in the second half of the 19th century, their role remained limited until the
unification of Germany in the 1870s. The Kredit banks founded at the mid-
dle of the century were weakened by the difficulties of the 1857 crisis.
During the disturbed financial conditions of the war years they committed
substantial sums in an effort to support the price of the shares of the com-
panies they owned and thus tied up a larger proportion of their capital in
holdings of company stocks than their normal operations would have dic-
tated. It was during this period that the banks sought to develop the cur-
rent account (kontokorrent) connections with firms that was to come to
dominate the banks’ business activities and to produce the idea of a “haus”
bank. These banks reached the top of their power at the turn of the centu-
ry and can be presumed to have exercised a great deal of influence on
Schumpeter’s thinking as expressed in the Theory of Economic
Development.
Despite Schumpeter’s optimistic view of the operation of the German
Kreditbanks in support of dynamic economic growth, there is a widely held
belief that these industrial of “mixed” banks are more unstable than banking
systems in which banks are “separated” or segregated as in the US after the
1930s depression. There is some historical evidence to support this view,
such as the difficulties faced by German industrial banks in the 1857 crisis,
the Italian industrial banking collapse in the 1920s and difficulties faced by
mixed banks throughout Europe in the 1930s as the value of their industrial
holdings collapsed in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Credit Anstalt. 
The first question that must be faced in any discussion of policies to create
a financial system capable of satisfying Schumpeter’s view of the impor-
tance of the extension of bank credit in furthering competitive innovation is
whether industrial banking is more prone to instability than other forms of
organisation and whether the periodic bouts of crisis more than offset the
benefits during expansion. 
39This may be investigated by defining a bank as a firm which funds the
acquisition of its income earning assets by issuing sight deposit liabilities,
earning income from the difference between the costs of deposits and the
income of the assets acquired. Figuratively, this activity could be expressed
as “riding the yield curve” since bank income results from taking a spread
position: borrowing short and lending long in the expectation that the for-
mer will fall relative to the latter. This means that earnings will be influenced
by interest rate movements that are expressed in changes in the position
and shape of the yield curve. As one of us noted elsewhere: 
“The archtypal commercial bank operating in a segregated system is restricted
to spread positions on a small stretch of the yield curve for a particular type of
asset: sight deposits against 90-day secured (real) commercial loans. Mixed 
banks, on the other hand, are free to play wherever they like on (or across) the
curves for any asset they choose. This representation makes it obvious that the
latter will be subject to greater risks of “speculative” balance sheets in 
Minsky’s sense because they are less certain to be able to sell assets at prices
that allow them to repay their short liabilities on demand. They will also have 
greater risk of becoming insolvent because the value of longer maturity assets
will generally be more sensitive to shifts or inversions in the yield curve as well
as being traded in less liquid markets, while the returns on their assets will 
remain fixed (or may fall if asset prices or dividends fall) when short-term funds
have to replaced at higher costs. Mixed banks bear additional interest rate and
price risk, will have more volatile earnings, and higher risk of illiquidity and insol-
vency (cf. Kregel, 1995). 
The most obvious remedy for the instability caused by the spread positions
taken by banks in a unified system is to limit their operations to the short
end of the yield curves for particular, low risk assets, leaving the rest of the
curve (and all the rest of the asset structure) to investment banks who are
free to accept the additional risk, but only with their own capital, not the
funds of risk-averse depositors. This remedy recalls the “real bills” doctrine,
the Chicago proposals for 100% reserve banking advanced by Henry
Simons, Frederich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, as well as the recently
popular proposals (cf. Litan, 1987, Pierce, 1991) in the US for “core” banks
limited to investing depositor funds in “risk free” government securities. All
of these proposals rest on the idea that a low risk commercial bank provid-
ing transactions services to the public can be separated from high risk
investment banks, who would continue to carry on the investment functions
of “mixed” banks, but without placing short-term deposit funds at risk.
Thus, policy should act to segregate the financing function of banks from
the provision of safekeeping and transactions services in order to ensure
financial stability and the full financing of innovative competitive activity.
40The only problem with the logic behind this argument is that investment
banks in the US have shown no revealed preference for risk and do not gen-
erally play the entire yield curve and spectrum of available assets. Further,
banks in the UK, which are not subject to any special regulations on their
activities, behave as it they were subject to segregation, limiting their activ-
ity to short term lending. Experience suggests that investment banks in seg-
regated systems have not taken over the Schumpeterian role of investment
financing. Rather, investment banks in the US have tended to use their cap-
ital for short-term trading of new and existing capital assets as dealers or
market-makers in the longer segment of the yield curve forbidden to com-
mercial banks. 
But, by making capital markets more liquid markets, they reduce the liquid-
ity risk of holding long-term assets which is born in segregated systems by
the final holders, the general public; by taking very short-term positions in
long-term assets they are also able to avoid most of the price and interest
rate risk associated with such assets. Investment banks in a segregated
system tend to be traders, rather than risk-taking long-term investors. The
role of investment banks in segregated systems has thus  not been the pro-
vision of long-term finance, but rather to organise liquid capital markets by
intermediating between the long-term holders of assets and long-term bor-
rowers. In doing this, they do commit their own capital, but the majority of
their transactions are financed by borrowing, usually from commercial
banks who have always been free to lend against securities collateral, for
example in the call money market.
The “separation” that occurs in such policy segregated systems is not in
fact between risk-averse commercial banks making short-term business
loans and risk-loving investment banks committing their own capital long
term, but between banks (both commercial banks as lenders to the invest-
ment banks and the investment banks as dealers) who reduce one class of
risk by acting as market makers, while households bear the price risks of
providing long-term investment finance. The more efficient the banks are in
reducing liquidity risk, the more willing households will be to accept price
risks and the greater the amount of direct capital market intermediation
through the financial markets. 
From the point of view of the economic system this may reduce overall risk
because it is spread over a larger base (there are more households than
investment banks). As households are generally limited to lower leverage in
financing their asset holdings than financial institutions, they are less likely
to be subject to insolvency as a result of price risk. This is what might be
classified as a “market” based system. But, the important characterising
feature is the distribution of risks across types of banks and households,
41rather than the method of intermediation via banks or the market. The pol-
icy conclusion is then that intervention to separate banks activities does not
create a class of banks that provides investment finance, but instead has
been associated with the creation of increased capital market liquidity that
has shifted a key component of risk off bank balance sheets to private
households. 
This raises the question of why mixed banks manage their capital invest-
ment activities differently from investment banks in a segmented system,
and appear to be willing to undertake the additional price risks of direct
investment in long-term assets. In theory, the additional risks identified in
mixed-bank systems should produce a tendency for bank organisational
form to converge to the lower risk system, either through direct govern-
mental regulation or the operation of the law of natural selection. Yet,
mixed-bank systems have persisted over long periods and, in the case of
Germany, have even survived periods of deep financial crisis. Indeed, EU
legislation now makes universal banking the standard banking form. This
suggests that either the perception of additional risk in such banks is mis-
taken, or that they have evolved natural protection systems and alternative
methods of reducing risks. The question that has to be answered in this
regard is how mixed banks have managed to avoid the price risks associ-
ated with financing their investments in long-term capital assets. 
The instability of the German system in the inter-war period would appear
to conform to the presumption of the inherent instability associated with
mixed banking. It does not, however, support the belief that such banks
provide a substitute for the capital market. The operation of German mixed
banks was closely linked to the existence of an active stock market and as
seen above they operated as “traders”, but of start up companies and on a
slightly longer term than was typical of US investment banks. Their activi-
ties were thus very similar to venture capitalists in a segregated system,
seeking good new prospects and taking an active interest in their manage-
ment until they can be floated on the stock market in an IPO.
The answer to this paradox can be found in the content of German bank
law (cf. Kregel 1992 c, 1995). While it does not restrict banks to the types
of business they can engage in (although there are some restricted areas),
it does place constraints on the composition of bank balance sheets. These
take the form of “Principles Concerning the Capital Resources and Liquidity
of Credit Institutions”. The most basic of these is the ‘liquidity principle’
(Principle II), which limits long-term lending to long-term funding, defined as
the bank’s own equity plus sale of bank bonds, long-term borrowing, 60%
of savings deposits and 10% of current accounts and time deposits of non-
financial entities. Thus, instead of segregating the financial system, German
42legislation segregated the individual bank’s balance sheet into short and
long term activities, with maturity matching in each section.
22
In simple terms the regulations imposed on German banks since the 1930s
crisis have produced the logical equivalent of the separation of commercial
and investment banks by imposing asset separation within the balance
sheet of a single “mixed” bank. A German bank is required to match assets
and liabilities within particular segments of the yield curve. Reduction in liq-
uidity risk for banks holding long-term capital assets is achieved by imposed
a rough matching of maturities in the long and short segments. However,
such regulation does not necessarily eliminate price risk. Price risk would
only be eliminated if banks matched the particular payment and return char-
acteristics of assets and liabilities, using fixed-interest borrowing to fund
fixed-interest lending of the same terms; and the sale of bank equity to
investors to match bank investment in the equity of non-financial firms. 
In this respect it is interesting to note that in the German system fixed-inter-
est term lending has replaced venture capital type lending of 19th century
Kredit banks, and their reliance on the equity market has all but disappeared
in the post-war period. Clearly a major shift occurred in the system after the
war.
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22  In addition (Principle III) the bank’s portfolio of loans, advances, discounted bills, quoted shares
and liabilities of other credit institutions cannot exceed 60% of current and time deposits of non-
financial entities, 35% of the current and time deposits held by financial entities, 20% of savings
deposits, 35% of borrowing with a maturity from one month to four years and 80% of the bank’s
issue of acceptances, notes, bills drawn on itself and international letters of credit. Principle I requires
bank capital (including reserves and retained earnings) to a minimum of 1/18th of total lending to
firms, individuals and its book credits and non-controlling interests. In 1990 this list was extended
to include risk adjusted off balance sheet exposures for financial swaps, forward contracts and
option rights. Principle Ia limits a bank’s outstanding acceptances, promissory notes and bills drawn
on debtors to a maximum of 1.5 times its own capital, calculated an reported on a daily basis. 
In 1990 Ia “was amended more substantially to limit all ‘price risks’, - including in particular those
arising from off balance sheet financial instruments - to 60% of a bank’s liable capital”
(Bundesbank,1990, p. 39). Within this 60% limit there are individually binding class limits of 30%
for foreign currency and precious metal risks, 20% for interest rate risks from interest rate forward
contracts and options, and 10% of other forwards and options on shares and index-linked contracts.
As a result of the spread of new financial  product innovations Principle I was”extended to consti-
tute a general counterparty risk principle going beyond mere credit risk. Principle Ia ... provide(s) a
general set of rules aimed at containing ... the price risks involved in certain types of transactions
which are particularly risk-prone because they require little or no capital input (leverage effect).”
Further, there are regulations on the size of loans: single loans cannot exceed 75% (reduced to 50%
in 1985) of the bank’s own capital; the five largest loans cannot exceed three times own capital
(abolished in 1985) and all large loans cannot exceed eight times loan capital.  These large loans,
defined as those which exceed 15% of bank capital, have to be reported without delay to the
Bundesbank, and all loans above DM 1 million also have to be reported. “The main duty of the
recording centre is to ascertain the indebtedness of borrowers who have obtained credits of or
exceeding DM 1 million from two or more institutions, and to inform the lending institutions regard-
ing the amount of their borrowers’ total credit indebtedness and the number of lenders.”
(Bundesbank Annual Report, 1962, p. 95). This has now been raised to 3 million. First, even in the absence of any change in regulation, just as firms even-
tually outgrew the ability of their “hausbanks” to finance them, banks could
never expand their equity sufficiently rapidly to provide sufficient equity
capital for investment in the industrial sector. If the use of pure equity
finance had become dominant, then the German banks would either have
become massive mutual investment funds or in the absence of the possi-
bility of raising unlimited capital they would have become predominantly
market makers in securities, rather than long-term lenders. In the event the
war and the currency reform had the effect of virtually wiping out both the
existing supply of government and private securities, eliminating the sec-
ondary capital market; the financing of new investment was primarily
through retained earnings and short-term bank borrowing. 
This situation required a sharp change in the methods of operation of the
large banks. First, it meant that the banks could not finance and underwrite
the issue of share capital in the formation of new firms because there was
no capital market in which to float the shares once the companies were
launched. Thus, the Schumpeterian activity of German banks effectively
came to an end with the 1930s recession and the subsequent war made it
impossible for them to recover their initial activities. It also meant that the
mechanism by which the banks financed  companies whose shares would
then be floated in the securities markets could no longer be completed since
there was no capital market to absorb the new issues. 
As the recovery strengthened, the banks thus continued to accumulate
demand and time deposits and the short-term loans to firms were rolled
over into medium and long-term loans (the ratio of short to medium-long
lending was split about evenly in 1954), since they could not be repaid by
floating securities in capital markets. The banks were thus faced with an
ever increasing maturity mismatch. This method of financing reconstruc-
tion, in the absence of capital markets, thus recreated instability because
deposits could be withdrawn at any time, creating a liquidity crisis, and any
change in yield differentials, such as might be caused by inflation, might
cause insolvency if short rates had to be increased rapidly to retain deposits
while long term lending rates remained fixed. 
The former was a threat for the smaller banks, but for the larger banks with
extensive branches the threat of a deposit drain was small. The inflation
threat applied to all banks. There was an additional threat due to a loss in
deposits from a drain of deposits abroad, but this possibility was eliminat-
ed by the existence of controls on both trade and financial flows. There
were a number of policy initiatives to attempt to revive the capital market,
none of which had any impact.
44In order to meet the prudential regulations in such conditions, banks issued
long-term bonds, which were held within the financial sector, and then
slowly started to be held by the public. In this way fixed interest liabilities
matched the term lending of the banks to firms and the reliance on bond
finance may be seen as a structural result of the way in which price risks
are hedged in the German system and as a substitute for the pre-war use
of the equity market. The German mixed bank system is thus no less
dependent on capital markets to reduce risk than segmented bank systems,
both require them to provide a reduction in price risks. The difference is in
the type of asset, bonds or equity, which dominates capital markets and
whether they are direct or intermediated.
The comparison of the German and US methods of imposing prudential seg-
regation as a stability policy suggests that instead of referring generically to
mixed banks (or universal banks as has become more common) vs com-
mercial banks, it would be more informative to refer to balance sheet seg-
regation and functional segregation. The fact that neither investment banks
nor mixed banks are willing or able to raise sufficient equity capital to pro-
vide equity finance for the industrial sector leads to long-term financing via
public equity markets in the former and reliance on bond market finance in
the latter. In terms of risk, and thus instability, there seems to be little dif-
ference between the two forms of bank regulation.
This suggests that much of the policy discussion, contrasting the stability
of segregated and mixed bank regulatory structures, has been misplaced.
From the point of view of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” or
Minskyian “endogenous financial fragility” a certain amount of evolutionary
instability is necessary to allow the competitive innovation that makes the
system viable. To the extent that banks and other financial institutions pro-
vide the financial resources that allow firms to appropriate resources that
lead to successful innovations, they will also be financing firms whose com-
petitive strategies are unsuccessful. Perfectly safe and stable banks would
mean  stagnant economic development. It thus seems clear that the major
objective of policy cannot be the elimination of change and instability for
this would eliminate economic development. Rather policy should be direct-
ed towards ensuring financing of innovative capital projects. The historical
comparison suggests that this is not a contrast between market and bank-
based financial system since Schumpeter’s “ideal” German Kredit bank was
in fact fully integrated in the equity market before the war and in capital
markets after. 
The role of policy should be to provide the appropriate integration of finan-
cial institutions and markets that prevents the kind of endemic systemic
instability that causes major reversals of capital flows and changes in finan-
cial prices that lead to Minsky-Fisher debt deflations. 
45This will involve three major areas. The first is risk management. As seen
above, the major activity of banks is risk management, not undertaking the
risks of maturity mismatches. The second is the way these risks are shift-
ed from financial institutions to other balance sheets, primarily those of the
public. This process puts the emphasis on the provision of market liquidity.
Households will be more willing to hold long-term assets if some of  the risk
of holding them is offset by the ability to sell the assets at short notice in
liquid markets. In turn this liquidity depends on the activity of financial insti-
tutions serving as market makers, either directly or indirectly as a result of
their own investment activities. Their ability to make markets depends on
their financing, in particular on their gearing or leverage ratios. In the near
financial crash of August 1998, excess leverage of a number of financial
institutions meant that the liquidity in many major asset markets was deter-
mined by the trading activity of these institutions. When the excessive
leverage caused them to retrench it destroyed market liquidity and produced
a collapse in asset prices that bordered on a Minsky debt deflation and
caused the flow of new financing of all sorts for competitive innovations by
any firm, irrespective of its credit rating, to dry up completely. Thus the
areas in which policy will have to act are risk management techniques of
financial institutions, the way in which this risk management shifts risks to
balance sheets outside the financial sector, the provision of market liquidi-
ty, and the degree of leverage of balance sheets.
At the same time, the diverse way in which Germany and the US used pol-
icy to reach broadly similar results should be seen as linked to their respec-
tive industrial structures. The question is not so much whether more mar-
ket or less is more beneficial, but rather the development and support of the
financial system that is most appropriate to ensuring the pursuit of knowl-
edge-based activities in those sectors which can assure greatest per capita
income growth. This will mean defending indigenous financial systems in
the same way as acting to develop and protect industrial “competitive”
advantage. A good recent example is the German policy of Finanzplatz
Deutschland (cf Kregel, 1998d, and Dore, 2000 part III). In an increasingly
integrated and globalised economic environment the challenges faced by
countries seeking to better their lot will become ever more difficult and may
require increased regional integration. 
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